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Introduction
In this lecture xenotransplantation is considered
from the point of view of animal ethics. The
main point is to show that a specific cluster of
arguments commonly used in favour of xeno-
transplantation, simplifies the ethical questions
involved. This simplification may be favourable
for political reasons in a short time perspective,
but may at the same time be disastrous from an
ethical point of view in the long run. If the eth-
ical questions regarding xenotransplantation
are reduced to a simple yes or no, this will over-
shadow more important questions of how xeno-
transplantation may be implemented in an ethi-
cally responsible way. Resisting this simpli-
fication, we have to explore instead the neces-
sary conditions under which xenotransplanta-
tion may be carried through or rejected. 
Ethics is often expected to deliver simple an-
swers to complex questions. The bottom line of
an ethical argument is expected to say yes or no.
This way of understanding ethical contributions
to the public and scientific discourse about
xenotransplantation, or any scientific and pub-
lic discourse, is however not in accordance with
the ethical point of view. People who expect
simple and clear-cut answers to moral questions
do not - or at least not always – expect these un-
ambiguous answers because they want ethics to
be of importance to the questions involved.
Very often they expect unambiguous answers
for the opposite reason. They want clear-cut an-
swers just to get rid of ethical considerations.
When ethics is reduced to a simple yes or no,
then it is of no use and not worth taking into
consideration. So ethics is from this point of
view trapped in a "catch 22". If it can't deliver
simple answers, it is of no use, and if it delivers
simple answers, it certainly is of no use.  
Contrary to the demand for simplicity I there-
fore want to say, using the words of the poet
Søren Kierkegaard, "that in this day and age
when everybody is striving to make everything
more easy, my task is to make everything more
difficult", or at least as difficult as possible
within twenty minutes. I am not doing this be-
cause I love difficulties, but because I think we
have to consider more deeply what xenotrans-
plantation is all about. Putting something into
action, there is a world of difference between
doing it with or without an extended conscious-
ness of what we are actually doing. So let us
look more closely into the matter of xenotrans-
plantation from the perspective of animal
ethics.  
Animal welfare and xenotransplantation
The main arguments in favour of breeding ge-
netically modified pigs for xenotransplantation
are summed up in the following statement from
the 1996 Nuffield Council Report (1) on the
ethics of xenotransplantation:
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"While the pig is an animal of sufficient in-
telligence and sociability to make welfare
considerations paramount, there is less evi-
dence that it shares capacities with human
beings to the extent that primates do. As
such, the adverse effects suffered by the pigs
used to supply organs for xenotransplanta-
tion would not outweigh the potential bene-
fits to human beings. It is also difficult to see
how, in a society in which the breeding of
pigs for food and clothing is accepted, their
use for life-saving medical procedures such
as xenotransplantation could be unaccept-
able." 
From this point of view xenotransplantation
seems to be a clear-cut case. Of course, taken
literally the Nuffield Council is not rejecting
animal welfare considerations. On the contrary,
the statement says that animal welfare perspec-
tives are paramount. But put into practice it says
that animal welfare perspectives may not be
given preference when at variance with human
interests. Or put more bluntly: we may put
weight on animal welfare, provided this does
not jeopardize human welfare. But considering
animal welfare only when it is consistent with
human welfare is next to nothing. The problem
is what we ought do when animal welfare is not
consistent with human welfare. And in these
situations, the Council says, animal welfare has
to make way for human welfare.
Reading the statement more closely we may
identify three main arguments for this point of
view. Firstly: Xenotransplantation has to do
with the saving of human lives, and when hu-
man life has to be weighted against animal life,
then human life takes priority. Today people are
dying because of the shortage of organs avail-
able for transplantation, so breeding and killing
animals for xenotransplantation will compen-
sate for this shortage and therefore save the
lives of human beings. In this situation, forced
to choose between animal lives and human
lives, human lives have the preference. 
Secondly: From a biological point of view we
may prefer to use organs taken from primates
for xenotransplantation. But from an ethical
point of view primates are too close to human
beings. They may react and suffer much in the
same way as human beings do. Restrictions put
on the use of human transplant may therefore
apply also to the use of transplants taken from
non-human primates. Pigs, on the other hand,
are different from human beings to an extent
that primates are not; hence, arguments stated
against the use of primates for xenotransplanta-
tion are not valid with regard to pigs. 
Thirdly: The use of animals is not at all ex-
traordinary.  The use of pigs for human benefits
is established long ago by the breeding of pigs
for food and clothing. When this is so, the
breeding of pigs for xenotransplantation may be
just as, or even more, legitimate.
Let us consider these arguments more closely,
one by one, beginning with the second argu-
ment. What this argument says, is not just that
the arguments against the use of primates are
not applicable to the use of pigs. It also implies
that the arguments against the use of primates
are conclusive. This is why primates are not in
use for xenotransplantation. But why are these
arguments not conclusive as far as pigs are con-
cerned? Of course there are differences be-
tween pigs and primates, but are these differ-
ences significant? Pigs may not possess the
same intelligence and sociability as primates;
let us take that for granted, at least for the sake
of argument. Does this imply by logic that pigs
do not have the same capacity for suffering, or
that the suffering brought upon pigs does not
count because they are not as smart and intelli-
gent as primates are? Is the difference between
primates and pigs lager than the difference be-
tween primates and human beings, regarding
intelligence and sociability?  
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The question of  suffering is a utilitarian one.
But utilitarianism is not the only perspective
relevant in this case. It is also possible or even
necessary to apply a deontological perspective
and ask whether a pig has any right to lead a
pig's way of life. A pig is not just an isolated or-
ganism capable of responding to external stim-
uli. To be a pig is also to lead a pig's way of life. 
The word "rights" is, as you all know, contro-
versial in animal ethics. My point of view may
be phrased like this: Regardless of suffering I
think we have good reasons for saying that pigs
have a right to lead a pig's way of life. But if the
word "right" is offending you, I may just as well
say that we have a certain obligation to permit
pigs to lead a pig's way of life. This is not con-
troversial with regard to primates, so why
should it be controversial with regard to pigs? 
If we are not convinced by the reasons for treat-
ing pigs and primates differently, conclusions
may be drawn in two different directions. We
may either lower the primates down to the pig's
level, permitting the use of primates for xeno-
transplantation too, or we may raise the pigs to
a higher level and say that pigs are to be pro-
tected against xenotransplantation to the same
extent that primates are. 
The third argument says, as we have heard al-
ready, that the use of pigs for xenotransplanta-
tion is made legitimate by the extensive use of
pigs for food and clothing. But this argument
does not hold water either. There are several im-
portant differences between the breeding of
pigs for xenotransplantation and the breeding
of pigs for food and clothing, and because of
these differences it is impossible to make xeno-
transplantation acceptable by just pointing to
our use of animals for food and clothing. Let
me mention very briefly just three of these rea-
sons.
The first reason is that the use of pigs for xeno-
transplantation requires extensive use of animal
experimentation. It is not controversial, I think,
to say that these experiments have caused ex-
tensive animal suffering, and that they are likely
to cause animal suffering in the future, too. But
this is not the main point in my argument, be-
cause the point is that these experiments are not
within the limits of what a farmer is allowed to
do to his animals. There is a basic difference be-
tween a farmer and a researcher, and if we take
into consideration how the researcher is al-
lowed to treat an animal, this is an exception to
ordinary requirements regarding farm animals.
So the ordinary use of pigs for food and cloth-
ing is not sufficient to make animal experimen-
tation acceptable. 
The second reason is that the use of pigs for
xenotransplantation requires transgenic pigs
and hence genetic transformation of the pigs in
use. But when we breed pigs for food and cloth-
ing, genetic engineering is not permitted. This
has of course partly to do with food safety, but
that is not all there is to it. The prohibition of
genetically modified farm animals is also meant
to protect animals against infringement and in-
justice. So breeding pigs for food and clothing
does not make genetic engineering legitimate. 
The third reason is that the way of breeding pigs
for xenotransplantation is not in concordance
with rules normally applied to the keeping and
confinement of farm animals. Especially be-
cause of the danger of infection, pigs in use for
xenotransplantation may be kept isolated to an
extent far above what is normally accepted for
farm animals.
These and similar reasons taken together ex-
plain why the use of pigs for food and clothing
does not make the use of pigs for xenotrans-
plantation acceptable. This does not mean of
course that xenotransplantation is to be re-
jected. The point is that eating pork and wear-
ing a fur coat are as such not sufficient to legit-
imate xenotransplantation. 
These lines of argument lead to the conclusion
that just playing human life off against animal
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life is a superficial simplification. Giving hu-
man life a preference over and against animal
life does not imply a carte blanche to treat ani-
mals according to our own convenience only.
Moreover, just playing human life off against
animal life implies that we have no other alter-
native. Is that true? If we resign from xeno-
transplantation does that imply that we have to
resign from transplantation all together? Of
course it doesn't mean that. The shortage of hu-
man organs may also be compensated for by
our efforts to increase the availability of human
organs. One may of course be pessimistic re-
garding the possibility of satisfying the demand
for organs by these efforts, but xenotransplanta-
tion is no secure road to success either. And
then we have the use of stem cells. In the end
the situation may very well be that xenotrans-
plantation appears to be a sidetrack. This may
take some years of course, but there are never-
theless reasons to believe, that the main track to
organ supplement would be stem cell research.
The question of xenotransplantation is there-
fore not a question of saving human lives or not,
but a question of different roads to the saving of
human lives. 
The relationship between humans and pigs
Another important question is how, or to what
extent, xenotransplantation may affect our un-
derstanding of the relationship between animals
and human beings. Usually this question has
been discussed with regard to the human self-
esteem, self-consciousness and self-under-
standing.  My perspective is however, the donor
perspective, so my question is if or to what ex-
tent xenotransplantation may change our under-
standing of animals. 
Some have argued that xenotransplantation will
pave the way to a more inclusive understanding
of animals. But this is just wishful thinking. As
mentioned already, using pigs for xenotrans-
plantation presupposes the difference between
pigs and humans. Blurring this difference
means making xenotransplantation more dubi-
ous. I think we have a real dilemma here. On the
one hand pigs may be used for xenotransplanta-
tion because they have a biological resemblance
to human beings. On the other hand pigs may be
used for xenotransplantation just because they
are not human beings, or not even primates. The
closer pigs are connected to human beings from
an ethical point of view, the more dubious xeno-
transplantation becomes.  So to promote xeno-
transplantation we have to stick to the differ-
ence and probably extend it, and at the same
time make the most of the similarities. 
Our way of thinking is not always changed by
the use of arguments. We may want this to be
the case, but the fact is that our way of thinking
is often changed as a result of new technology.
By changing our ways of life, technology also
conveys new ideas and new ways of thinking.
For this reason it is not far fetched to imagine
that an extensive use of xenotransplantation
may change our understanding of what a pig ac-
tually is. Through genetic engineering we may
not just change the animals, but implicitly
change our understanding of animals too. Ani-
mals have already, from a genetic point of view,
become inconstant or contingent in a way never
seen before. The genetic engineering we apply
to the pigs today is of a minor kind. So it is still
obvious to speak of a genetically altered pig as
a pig. But these restrictions put on our genetic
engineering are in no way necessary; they are
minor just for the time being. So I think we
must prepare ourselves for questions more far
reaching than the questions we confront today.
Questions I have in mind are questions such as:
when is a genetically modified heart of a pig not
a pig's heart any more? And when is a geneti-
cally altered pig not a pig any more? And if it
isn't a pig, then what is it? Let us imagine that
the demand for modified pig's hearts suddenly
is satisfied. Is it possible to sell the surplus as
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pork, or is it cannibalism to eat hearts from
these pigs? Is the consequence of xenotrans-
plantation the establishment of a new category
of living creatures, labelled replacement parts?
And what about the human understanding of
what it is to be a human being. Will this under-
standing be changed if we transform animals to
an assembly of replacement parts? 
These questions may seem a bit gothic or even
bizarre, but the point is that they uncover possi-
ble consequences implied in the use of this kind
of new technology. Abhorring from these ques-
tions will not do us any good. 
Final considerations
Questions and arguments raised in this lecture
are not conclusive with regard to xenotrans-
plantation. I am not saying that xenotransplan-
tation is to be abandoned. What I am saying is,
that if we are to put xenotransplantation in ac-
tion, we have to pay serious attention to the
source animal welfare perspective. This may
not be the most important perspective, but it is
nevertheless one of several important perspec-
tives.  If we can't afford time and money to take
this perspective into account, xenotransplanta-
tion may not be the way to human flourishing
that we expect today. 
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